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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3397 
___________ 
 
WILLIE EDWARDS, JR., 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
BAY STATE MILLING COMPANY 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.C. Civil No. 2:10-cv-05309) 
District Judge:  Honorable Dennis M. Cavanaugh 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
March 7, 2013 
Before:  RENDELL, JORDAN and VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 2, 2013) 
_________ 
 
OPINION 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Willie Edwards, Jr., proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the District of New Jersey granting Bay State Milling Company‟s (“the 
Company”) motion to dismiss.  Because his appeal is lacking an arguable basis in law, 
we will dismiss it. 
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I. 
 Because we primarily write for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  Edwards is a former employee of the Company‟s Clifton, New Jersey 
facility whose employment was terminated in February 2009.  He filed a charge of 
discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) on May 
18, 2009, alleging discrimination based upon his race.  The EEOC sent him a Notice of 
Right to Sue on, at the latest, December 31, 2009.
1
 
 On October 6, 2010, Edwards filed his complaint alleging employment 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 
2000e-5 and age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (“ADEA”) of 1967, 29 U.S.C. § 623, in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York.  In his complaint, he alleged that the Company engaged 
in race discrimination by subjecting only African-Americans to drug testing.  On October 
15, 2010, Edwards‟ case was transferred from the Southern District of New York to the 
District of New Jersey.  The Company filed a motion to dismiss on December 9, 2011, 
which the District Court granted on July 31, 2012.  Edwards timely filed this appeal. 
II. 
                                              
1
 The EEOC‟s Notice of Right to Sue, submitted by the Company in support of its motion 
to dismiss, is clearly dated December 2009.  However, the day it was issued is not clear 
from the date stamp.  Accordingly, we assume that the Notice was issued, at the latest, on 
December 31, 2009. 
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We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‟s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a 
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to 
relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting 
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We look for “„enough facts 
to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of‟ the necessary 
elements” of a claim for relief.  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 
2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).  Because Edwards is proceeding in forma 
pauperis, we must dismiss his appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) if it “lacks an 
arguable basis either in law or fact.”  Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). 
III. 
 Under Title VII, a plaintiff wishing to file a complaint must do so in federal court 
within ninety days of receipt of the EEOC‟s Notice of Right to Sue.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
5(f)(1); see also Burgh v. Borough Council of Borough of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 
(3d Cir. 2001).  A letter is “received” when it is delivered to a claimant‟s residence or 
post office box, not when the claimant has actual physical possession of the letter.  See 
Ebbert v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 319 F.3d 103, 115 n.15 (3d Cir. 2003).  When the 
actual date of receipt is known, that date controls; where the actual date of receipt is 
unknown, courts will presume receipt took place three days after the EEOC mailed it.  
See Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. and Med. Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999). 
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Here, Edwards filed his charge on May 18, 2009, and the EEOC issued a Notice of 
Right to Sue on December 31, 2009 at the latest.  Nothing in the record indicates the 
actual date Edwards received the Notice; therefore, we presume that he received it on 
January 4, 2010.
2
  See id.  Edwards had ninety days from January 3, 2010, or until 
Monday, April 5, 2010, to file his complaint.
3
  However, he did not do so until October 6, 
2010, approximately six months too late.  Accordingly, Edwards‟ Title VII claim was 
untimely filed, and the District Court properly granted the Company‟s motion to dismiss 
this claim. 
 A plaintiff wishing to allege a violation of the ADEA must file an “administrative 
discrimination charge [with the EEOC] within 300 days of the challenged employment 
action.”  Watson v. Eastman Kodak Co., 235 F.3d 851, 854 (3d Cir. 2000) (alteration in 
original); see also 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2).  Edwards‟ charge, filed within 300 days of his 
termination, only alleged discrimination based upon his race, and he has not presented 
any evidence that he ever filed an age discrimination charge with the EEOC within 300 
days of a challenged employment act.  Accordingly, the District Court properly granted 
the Company‟s motion to dismiss Edwards‟ ADEA claim. 
IV. 
                                              
2
 January 3, 2010 fell on a Sunday.  Accordingly, January 4, 2010 is the third day after 
December 31, 2009 on which mail would have been delivered. 
3
 Ninety days after January 3, 2010 falls on Saturday, April 3, 2010.  However, “the 
period continues to run until the end of the next day that is not a Saturday, Sunday, or 
legal holiday.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C) (noting that the rule applies to “any statute that 
does not specify a method of computing time”). 
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For the foregoing reasons, we hold that Edwards‟ appeal lacks an arguable basis in 
law, and we will dismiss it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
4
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 The District Court did not provide Edwards leave to amend his complaint before 
dismissing it with prejudice.  We conclude that the District Court did not err in declining 
to allow Edwards an opportunity to amend because we do not see how any amendment to 
his complaint would save his claims.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that a court should not dismiss pro se complaints without 
granting leave to amend unless “amendment would be inequitable or futile”). 
